The Rising Threat of JNIM in Mali
The question of whether the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) will take over Bamako remains a pressing concern. While it does not seem likely, the group appears to be employing a strategy aimed at regime implosion, making life increasingly unbearable for Malians. This approach is not unique to Mali; both Burkina Faso and Niger, the other two AES countries, are experiencing similar levels of insecurity and are struggling to protect themselves. The departure of these countries from ECOWAS has further complicated the situation, raising fears that the crisis could lead to the collapse of not only Sahelian states but also Gulf of Guinea countries.
The current state of affairs demands immediate action. We cannot afford to watch Mali implode as it poses a risk to the entire region. The time to act is now.
A New Era of Terrorist Tactics
Five years ago, a military junta took control of Mali with a firm promise to end terrorism and restore security, alongside ending French neo-colonialism and promoting national development. However, the reality today is starkly different. Last Saturday, Mariam Cisse, a 20-year-old social influencer with 90,000 followers on TikTok, was arrested by jihadists while creating content in her town of Tonka, near Timbuktu. The following day, she was brought back to the market, publicly accused of producing video content supportive of the military junta, and executed. There were no Malian security forces to protect her. Among the onlookers were her brother and uncle. This incident marked a significant turning point, highlighting the growing collective trauma caused by terrorists who have significantly evolved their tactics over the past few years.
The Evolution of Terrorism in Mali
In 2012, militants set out to capture the entire country, starting from the north. They captured territory after territory, establishing administrative and judicial structures for the implementation of Sharia law, while killing or jailing those who opposed them. They also destroyed libraries of the Sufi orders and burned down the tombs and mausoleums of their saints. The question then was how similar would Mali Jihad 201 be to Jihad 101.
Two months ago, fighters from JNIM imposed a fuel blockade that forced the government to close schools and halt harvesting in several regions. They burnt down over 100 fuel tankers attempting to bring fuel to Bamako via the Dakar-Bamako route. With that axis closed, the government started importing fuel from Cote d’Ivoire in the south, but that route was also closed. An attempt to bring in fuel from Niamey was equally unsuccessful. As a result, the three million inhabitants of Bamako are now encircled, with schools and businesses closed due to the lack of fuel. Inflation is surging due to the lack of goods.
The Impact of the 2020 Coup
The coup d’état led by Assimi Goita in August 2020 was supposed to end the state of insecurity and set Mali on a path of development based on full sovereignty. The French and the United Nations were expelled, and the patriots took over power. Five years later, however, the reality is that insecurity is worse than before the junta came into power. JNIM insurgents are quietly taking over villages, towns, and cities, but they are not establishing direct territorial control or a new administration. Instead, they are demonstrating their power, showing the people that the military is powerless.
Mali is a vast country with a landmass of 1,241,328 km² and a frontier of 7,240 kilometers with seven countries—Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania. If the country implodes, it could drag the entire West African region down with it. There is an urgent need for the region to engage in salvation mode intervention and diplomacy.
Lessons from the Past
In 2012, the inability of ECOWAS to deploy forces on the ground to combat insurgents led to the takeover of much of northern Mali by insurgents and the attempted march on Bamako. Without an ECOWAS Standby Force intervention, Mali was forced to call on France to send in jet fighters to stop the takeover of Bamako and fight back the terrorist takeover. Almost a decade later, France failed and was expelled from the country.
The French intervention from January 11, 2013, which began with air strikes and later ground troops, halted the advances of the insurgents and led to the recapture of all the major towns and cities they held. Up until that time, there had been endless discussions with the UN Security Council about authorizing the ECOWAS/African Union demand to establish a 3,300-strong mission to Mali, known as AFISMA, for an initial period of one year. The international community was slow to act, raising the issue of the “necessity” of a one-year human rights training for the troops to be sent. However, within three days, the insurgents took over the three key northern towns of Kidal, Timbuctoo, and Gao. It turned out that the plan all along was to bring in France. When the French took over Kidal, the vital artery to the north, they refused to carry the Malian army along and appeared to be making a deal with the Tuareg MNLA on the running of the city. That was the point in which the French agenda was exposed, and the rest, as they say, is history.
The Current State of Affairs
Given the high level of political repression in the country, there is no opposition to the military within the country. The junta dismisses the exiled opposition as megaphones of the gang of five orchestrated by France. Rumours circulating that the radical Salafist mobilizer, Imam Dicko, currently in exile in Algeria, would return to negotiate a way forward, have been dismissed by the government.
As the state crumbles, beautiful videos are being produced on the great success of the country against imperialism and on development. The latest this week is the laying of the foundation stone of the best hospital in West Africa that will be soon built by the government. The reality is that the government is not in charge of much of the country. The government is, however, right in its explanation that the gang of five—France, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, and Ukraine—are responsible for creating the massive insecurity characterizing the country. It appears that armed Ukrainian drones are used to blow up fuel tankers and cripple their military escorts. The recruitment of the Wagner group, now re-baptised as the African Corps, has not produced significant gains for the Malian army. It has, in fact, worsened their reputation, with the series of massacres of civilians they have orchestrated.
The Need for Regional Action
The problem for the junta is that it has justified its coup on a promise of improving the security situation, but this has failed. At the same time, there are virtually no other legitimate interlocutors within the country to seek a way out.
The two other AES countries—Burkina Faso and Niger—are suffering from similar levels of insecurity and appear unable to save themselves. The AES countries have left ECOWAS, but the crisis within them can lead to the implosion of not just the Sahelian states, but also the Gulf of Guinea countries.
We cannot sit down and watch Mali implode. We are all at risk. The time to act is now.
