Why India Bolsters Troops at Key Border Crossroads with Bangladesh?

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Strategic Moves in the Siliguri Corridor

Amid ongoing tensions with Dhaka and Bangladesh’s growing ties with Pakistan, India has significantly increased its military presence in a critical area known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” This narrow 22-kilometer strip, called the Siliguri Corridor, connects mainland India to its seven northeastern states. Surrounded by Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China, it remains one of India’s most sensitive geopolitical chokepoints.

According to recent media reports, India has reinforced its eastern frontier by establishing three fully operational garrisons at strategic points around the Siliguri Corridor near the India-Bangladesh border. While Indian officials have remained silent on these developments, evidence of extensive troop mobilization and reinforced deployments is evident.

The increased military presence comes as relations between India and Bangladesh have deteriorated following the ouster of Bangladeshi leader Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. During her 15-year rule, Hasina maintained relatively stable ties with India. However, the interim government in Dhaka, which took over after Hasina fled to India, is no longer as friendly towards New Delhi.

India’s Show of Force in the Northeast

Harsh V. Pant, head of the Strategic Studies Programme at the New Delhi think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF), highlighted that the Siliguri Corridor is a “strategic vulnerability that India must safeguard.” He noted that this is especially true amid rising anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh and indications that the Yunus government is not favorably inclined toward New Delhi.

In addition to the new garrisons, India’s air force staged one of its largest-ever air shows in the northeastern state of Assam on November 9. This was followed by seven days of large-scale air force exercises across northeast India that ran until November 20. These moves coincide with a visit by Pakistan’s navy chief to Dhaka and a Pakistani warship anchoring off Bangladesh for the first time since the 1971 war.

Pant stated that India has consistently signaled through military exercises “that it is cognizant of the challenges it faces in the region.” However, he believes the air show was not “particularly targeted at anything.”

Retired Indian Lieutenant General Utpal Bhattacharya echoed similar sentiments, noting that such exercises can be routine or strategic, depending on the situation. He added that intentions can change overnight, as today’s friend can become tomorrow’s adversary if trust erodes.

India-Bangladesh Ties at a Low Point

Despite Pant’s assertion that India’s military moves are defensive and should not be seen as seeking conflict, he warned that tensions could rise further due to “provocative” statements from Bangladesh’s interim government. He referred to comments made by Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus in March, where he described India’s northeastern states as “landlocked” and called Bangladesh “the only gateway to the ocean for the region.”

Dhaka maintains that Yunus’ remark aimed to highlight the potential for regional connectivity. However, given the area’s geopolitical sensitivity, the comment did not sit well with New Delhi. Both governments have remained quiet on recent military developments and declined requests for comment.

With national elections in Bangladesh scheduled for next February, India appears to be “waiting out” the interim government, signaling it will engage “only with an elected administration.” Pant suggested that normalization of relations could begin once there is a government with a mandate.

Background of Tensions

After the ouster of Hasina in August 2024, relations between India and Bangladesh hit their lowest point in years. During her 15-year tenure, Hasina helped dismantle anti-India insurgent networks, curbed militancy, and advanced connectivity projects, including allowing India access to the Bay of Bengal while bolstering security along the 4,000-kilometer border.

However, mistrust lingered under the surface. The 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in India, which allowed a streamlined citizenship process for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Christian religious minorities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, did not sit well with Bangladesh’s Muslim-majority population. Rhetoric in India branding Bengali-speaking migrants as “Bangladeshi infiltrators” also deepened hostility.

After Hasina’s fall, this anti-India sentiment surfaced, exacerbated by the former prime minister fleeing to India. Her ongoing refuge in India has deepened existing distrust. Despite repeated requests from Dhaka, New Delhi has remained silent on sending her back. Bangladesh views her access to Indian and international media as a further provocation.

On November 12, Dhaka summoned the Indian envoy to express concern over Hasina’s media appearances. She faces trial in absentia for crimes against humanity linked to last year’s deadly crackdown on anti-government protesters, with a verdict due on November 17.

Former Bangladeshi diplomat M. Humayun Kabir told PasarModern.com that for 15 years, India appeared to believe it could control Dhaka. “That era has now ended,” Kabir said, even as “India’s inclination to dominate Bangladesh has intensified.”

Pakistan-Bangladesh ‘Newfound Love’

Alongside the renewed tensions between India and Bangladesh, there has been a “newfound love” between Bangladesh and Pakistan, according to Pant from ORF. It was with Pakistan that Bangladesh fought a bloody war to break free in 1971, and India was a major supporter of the cause both diplomatically and militarily. However, since the interim government took power, Pakistan has stepped up its engagement with Dhaka.

Islamabad has sent high-level delegations, including its foreign minister and intelligence chief, to Dhaka, signed trade agreements, and revived military cooperation with naval visits and defense talks. Analysts suggest that Bangladesh is trying to counter India’s influence, while New Delhi sees the rapprochement as a security threat.

“Bangladesh will always acknowledge India’s role in 1971,” said security analyst and retired Bangladeshi general Fazle Elahi Akbar. “But that doesn’t mean it will keep bowing to India when its own interests are being sidelined,” he added.

Former diplomat Kabir noted that while Bangladesh “understands the foundations of its ties with India,” there is a need for “mutual respect, equality, and dignity,” elements Kabir argues are missing on India’s part.

One positive step is a visit by Bangladesh’s interim security adviser, Khalilur Rahman, to New Delhi on November 19 to attend the Colombo Security Conclave, a regional security conference hosted this year by his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval. The timing of the visit, amid heightened tensions, is seen as highly significant.