Delcy Rodriguez’s Castro Ode Challenges Venezuela’s US-China Tightrope Walk

Posted on

Political Tensions and Economic Interests in Venezuela

Venezuelan interim President Delcy Rodriguez recently paid tribute to Fidel Castro, sparking a sharp response from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. This exchange highlights the political tensions surrounding Caracas’ rapprochement with Washington, even as China seeks to maintain its economic interests in the South American country.

Rodriguez commemorated the centenary of the late Cuban leader’s birth by praising Castro as a figure who “transcends time” and invoking his commitment to sovereignty, social justice, and Latin American unity. However, Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants and a long-time critic of the communist government in Havana, responded sharply on social media. He described Castro as a complete failure at everything except destroying Cuba and impoverishing, jailing, and murdering his own people.

At the same time, Chinese President Xi Jinping also commemorated Castro’s centenary, praising his contribution to relations between Beijing and Havana and describing him as a founder and promoter of China-Cuba ties.

Analysts suggest that Rodriguez’s embrace of Castro should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence that Venezuela is returning to the geopolitical alignment of the Nicolas Maduro era. Instead, it may reflect the delicate balancing act facing Rodriguez as she accommodates an increasingly influential Washington while attempting to reassure elements of the Chavista movement at home.

The Decline of Chinese Strategic Influence

Parsifal D’Sola, founder and executive director of the Andres Bello Foundation-China Latin America Research Centre, stated that the United States has “without a doubt” substantially reduced China’s strategic influence in Venezuela since Maduro’s removal in January. The direct channel that once existed between Chinese decision-makers and the presidential palace in Caracas had effectively disappeared, with no mid-level Chinese official visits to Venezuela since January 3.

This retreat began well before Maduro’s removal. Chinese lending to Venezuela stopped in 2017, and major Chinese oil companies largely withdrew. Huawei reduced its operations, and the seniority of Chinese officials engaging with Caracas declined over the years.

Despite this, Venezuela remains important to Beijing because of its geography and vast natural resources. D’Sola described China as keeping “one foot inside” Venezuela while waiting to see how events developed rather than seeking to recreate the intense relationship of the Hugo Chavez era.

China’s Economic Position in Venezuela

R. Evan Ellis, a Latin America research professor at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, offered a different assessment of how much China had lost. He argued that China’s economic and strategic position in Venezuela has actually changed very little since January 3. China continues to buy significant quantities of Venezuelan oil, although it must now pay market prices, while its positions in oil joint ventures have not been substantially affected.

Ellis estimated that of roughly US$104 billion China had lent Venezuela over the years, all but about US$10 billion had been repaid, with no indication that the remainder would not be recovered. He noted that what China appears to have lost is face and certain prospects for non-economic relationships in the future, arguing that concerns about the damage to Beijing’s economic interests had been overstated.

Shifting Dynamics in China-Venezuela Relations

The distinction points to a potentially significant shift in the China-Venezuela relationship: Beijing may retain substantial commercial interests while losing some of the political access and strategic importance it enjoyed when Caracas was more isolated from Washington. Before Maduro’s removal, the relationship was not simply one of Chinese influence but of Venezuelan “dependency,” with most Venezuelan oil ultimately flowing to China and Beijing and Moscow playing important roles in the country’s energy sector.

That dependency has diminished as Rodriguez’s accommodation with the Trump administration has reopened other options for Caracas, including access to Western oil companies and markets. The share of Venezuelan oil going to China has consequently fallen significantly, Ellis said.

Rodriguez’s Stance on International Relations

Rodriguez has publicly defended Venezuela’s right to maintain relations with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba while simultaneously rebuilding ties with the United States. Beijing, for its part, has continued to describe Venezuela as an “all-weather” strategic partner and has signalled its intention to maintain economic cooperation with Caracas.

However, analysts questioned how much latitude Rodriguez now has to restore the broader strategic relationship with China. D’Sola suggested there is little possibility of Caracas substantially expanding relations with Beijing given Washington’s “marked tutelage” over the Rodriguez government, particularly because China’s principal interests in Venezuela—oil and mining—are also critical priorities for the United States.

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

Both analysts were skeptical that Rodriguez’s praise for Castro indicated a renewed foreign policy turn towards China or Cuba. D’Sola viewed the rhetoric primarily through the lens of Venezuela’s domestic politics, noting dissatisfaction among ideological Chavista hardliners with Rodriguez’s accommodation with Washington, the restoration of relations with Israel, and softer rhetoric towards the West.

Ellis similarly described the Castro tribute as an attempt to signal Rodriguez’s continued fidelity to the Chavista movement while her government pursued markedly different policies. He suggested Washington was ultimately likely to place more weight on Rodriguez’s actions than her rhetoric.

The episode illustrates the competing pressures confronting the Venezuelan leader seven months after Maduro’s removal: maintaining the support of a movement built partly around resistance to US influence while governing under dramatically altered relations with Washington.

For China, meanwhile, the emerging arrangement could prove more complicated than a straightforward loss of Venezuela to the United States. Beijing may retain access to Venezuelan oil, investments, and commercial opportunities even as Washington constrains the political and security dimensions of a relationship that was once among China’s closest in Latin America.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *