India’s Strategic Engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
India’s role within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is set to gain renewed attention as the 10-member Eurasian bloc prepares for its 2026 summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The event will focus on critical issues such as terrorism, cybercrime, infrastructure connectivity, and economic cooperation. As one of the key players in the region, India’s participation is expected to shape the future direction of the organisation.
The 2026 SCO Heads of State summit is scheduled for August 31 and September 1 in Bishkek, under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is anticipated to attend this significant gathering, which will mark the 25th anniversary of the organisation. The theme for the summit, “25 years of the SCO: Together Towards Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity,” underscores the group’s commitment to fostering regional stability and mutual growth.
The SCO originated as the “Shanghai Five” in 1996, comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It was formally established in 2001 with the admission of Uzbekistan. Over the years, the organisation has expanded significantly, with India and Pakistan joining in 2017, followed by Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024. This expansion has increased the SCO’s influence, with the grouping now accounting for about 25% of the world’s land area, 45% of the global population, approximately 23% of global nominal GDP, and about 36% of global GDP measured by purchasing power parity.
In 2025, during the summit held in Tianjin, China, the SCO laid the groundwork for deeper institutional reforms through the SCO Development Strategy to 2035. Emphasis was placed on modernising the organisation, improving its legal framework, and making its activities more project-oriented. The summit also highlighted the importance of combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism, along with addressing human, weapons, and drug trafficking, intelligence sharing, and joint security operations.
The upcoming 2026 Bishkek summit is expected to build upon these commitments, with proposals including the establishment of an International Centre for Combating Organised Crime, stronger cooperation against cybercrime and digital threats, and enhanced measures against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Another major proposal is the creation of an SCO Development Bank, aiming to establish a more independent financial architecture for the organisation.
Transport connectivity remains a significant focus of the Bishkek summit, particularly the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project. This over 500-kilometre railway, estimated at about $4.7 billion, is designed to connect China with Central Asia through the Torugart Pass and Jalal-Abad to Andijan in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan is also pursuing new logistics and cargo routes to improve the transit potential of SCO member states, including a proposed corridor linking Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Russia through the Caspian Sea.
India has used its membership since 2017 to push for stronger counter-terrorism frameworks, including the principles of “zero tolerance” and “no double standards” in combating terrorism. The country has also advocated for greater cultural and people-to-people exchanges through initiatives such as a proposed Civilizational Dialogue Forum, promotion of Buddhist heritage, and cultural festivals.
The proposed SCO Start-Up and Innovation Corridor could help broaden the organisation’s economic agenda beyond traditional energy and trade, creating opportunities for young people and knowledge-based economic cooperation. India can further use the SCO to advance cooperation in energy security, counter-narcotics, regional stability, environmental sustainability, and clean technology.
However, challenges remain, including limited connectivity, border tensions, and competing geopolitical interests. India’s concerns about the strategic implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the stalled Iran-Pakistan-India and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline projects highlight the difficulties confronting regional connectivity and energy cooperation.
Disagreements over Afghanistan continue to limit the SCO’s ability to develop a unified regional strategy, with India maintaining its position in favor of an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled” peace process. Additionally, India’s economic engagement with Central Asia remains relatively small compared with China’s, with trade accounting for less than 0.5% of India’s total trade.
Despite these challenges, the SCO remains relevant due to its enormous demographic and economic weight, security mechanisms, and potential to promote Eurasian connectivity. The organisation risks becoming more symbolic than functional if it fails to overcome internal rivalries and deliver concrete projects.
For India, the SCO should be viewed less as an ideological alliance and more as an instrument of strategic utility. India’s proactive participation and involvement enhance its global outreach, expanding its viability and visibility in the SCO. The country can use the platform to advance connectivity, counter-terrorism, and cultural diplomacy while managing the strategic challenge posed by China.
Ultimately, the success of the SCO will depend on its ability to move from declarations to practical, project-driven cooperation. If the organisation adapts to deliver concrete results, India stands to gain visibility and leverage in Eurasia. If not, India risks expending diplomatic energy in a bloc that offers limited returns. In short, the SCO matters for India only if it moves from symbolism to substance.
