The Legal and Constitutional Challenges of Extending Presidential Terms in Zimbabwe
In Zimbabwe, the question of whether President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s term can be legally extended without violating the two-term limit set by the Constitution has sparked intense debate. This issue involves a complex interplay of legal interpretations, constitutional principles, and political realities.
The Argument for Extension
Professor Jonathan Moyo has proposed that by amending the clause defining the length of each presidential term, the president’s stay in office could be “legally lengthened” without triggering a referendum or breaching the constitutional bar on serving more than two terms. According to Moyo, this approach would allow for an extension of the current term without directly altering the two-term limit. However, this argument is built on a foundation that crumbles under scrutiny.
The Constitution of Zimbabwe is not a document to be toyed with for political expedience. It is the supreme law of the land, designed to protect the people from precisely this kind of manipulation. When the framers of the 2013 Constitution included Section 91(2), which disqualifies anyone who has already served two terms as President from seeking re-election, they were deliberately closing the door on indefinite rule.
The Role of Section 95(2)(b)
Section 95(2)(b) defines each presidential term as five years. This provision is inseparable from the term limit in Section 91(2). A “term” in Zimbabwe’s constitutional sense is a five-year period. To alter that period is to alter the nature of the presidential term itself. You cannot stretch a five-year term to seven years and pretend that the incumbent is still serving the same two terms as before.
Moyo argues that such an amendment would not violate Section 91(2)’s term limit because the president would still be serving two terms, only longer ones. He further contends that Parliament could effect this change through a two-thirds majority vote, bypassing the referendum requirement outlined in Section 328(7)–(9).
Legal and Constitutional Implications
This reasoning is both legally unsound and constitutionally dishonest. It tries to do indirectly what the Constitution explicitly forbids doing directly. Section 328(7) of the Constitution was designed to prevent exactly this kind of backdoor manipulation. It provides that any amendment which extends the length of time any person may hold office shall not apply to anyone currently holding that office.
Even if Parliament were to pass a law increasing the presidential term from five to seven years, Mnangagwa would be constitutionally barred from benefiting from that change. It would apply only to future presidents, not to him. Any attempt to make it apply to the current incumbent would require amending Section 328(7) itself—and that would automatically trigger a national referendum, because it strikes at the very heart of the Constitution’s democratic safeguards.
Constitutional Intent and Democratic Legitimacy
Constitutions are not mechanical documents to be read literally; they must be interpreted purposively, with attention to the principles and objectives they are meant to uphold. Zimbabwe’s Constitution was crafted as a bulwark against authoritarianism. Its spirit is one of limitation, accountability, and periodic renewal of leadership through elections.
Moyo’s interpretation violates that spirit by reimagining the Constitution as a pliable instrument in the hands of those who govern. To claim that lengthening Mnangagwa’s current term to 2030 would be constitutional because it does not technically alter the two-term limit is to engage in what constitutional scholars call “textual manipulation.” It ignores that the substance, not just the form, of the law determines constitutionality.
The Broader Issue of Principle
Presidential term limits exist not because leaders are bad, but because power itself is corrupting. As Madhuku aptly noted, term limits are designed to restrain even good leaders from overstaying their welcome. They ensure the renewal of leadership and the accountability of those in power.
To erode that safeguard in pursuit of political convenience is to undo one of the few democratic gains Zimbabweans achieved after decades of struggle. The idea that a sitting president can remain in power beyond his mandate, without consulting the electorate, is the very definition of authoritarianism.
Ultimately, this is not just a legal argument—it is a moral and political one. Constitutions are written in the shadow of history, to prevent the repetition of its darkest chapters. Zimbabwe’s was written to ensure that no one man would ever again wield unaccountable power for an indefinite period.
If Mnangagwa truly respects it, he will step down when his term ends in 2028. If he does not, then his continued stay will mark not just the death of constitutionalism, but the triumph of impunity over law.
