The Struggle for a Humanitarian Truce in Sudan
The search for a humanitarian truce in Sudan has been marked by repeated false hopes and a lack of transparency. Our people deserve to know the truth, free from the information blackout that often accompanies such efforts. Promises that obscure reality only breed more pain and frustration, especially during times of war. It is crucial that we are candid with our people about the challenges ahead, rather than leaving them vulnerable to obscurantism.
Despite the efforts of mediators, the path to a truce remains fraught with difficulties. Claims of a ready-made agreement lack evidence, and while there may be understandings, the road to peace is filled with obstacles that must be approached with caution. The people of Sudan, as the main stakeholders, must be at the center of any peace process. Their voices should not be ignored, and they must be involved in the design, ownership, and participation of the peace process.
Before hastily embracing statements from regional and international forums, we need to study the challenges and how to address them. In this article, I will explore four key difficulties that hinder the achievement of a humanitarian truce.
1. The Position of the Army and Its Allies
The army command seeks to make the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) a junior partner, content with whatever share of power and resources the army and its allies allocate to it. This system rejects accountability and provides impunity as part of the deal, excluding genuine civilian forces. The army fears that a truce might allow the RSF to reorganize and rearm, potentially leading to renewed conflict.
The army sees its interest in continuing the war, despite a marriage of convenience with the Islamists. However, the Islamists remain wary of the current army leadership and reject the idea of the army fighting and negotiating, as was the case during al-Bashir’s era. They fear the international gateway that could bring the army into the fold of the international community and shut the door on the Islamists.
We must study the army’s position without aligning with it. The anti-war forces must present an alternative vision that carefully examines the army’s position and analyzes the relationship between the army and the Islamists. We must work internally, in line with the stated position of the mediation excluding the Islamists, and avoid conflating the army and the Islamists. Civilians are paying the price, and the Islamists’ project must be contained.
2. The Rapid Support Forces and Their Allies
The RSF announce a truce and claim to seek it, yet they simultaneously attack army positions and besiege cities. In this situation, they are on the offensive, not the defensive, which casts doubt on their seriousness about a truce. Their announcement of forming a government and building a state is a strategic move that complicates prospects for a swift truce and political process, prolonging the conflict without reaching a final settlement.
3. The Lack of Cohesion within the Mediation
The mediation has entered into conflict with itself, except for the United States, which appears distant from the disputes of other mediating countries. The lack of cohesion within the mediation and the demands by some parties to the war for the exclusion of others are negative indicators that weaken the mediation’s leverage and contribute to prolonging the war. Additionally, there is another quartet led by the African Union, and there is no clear coordination between the two quartets.
4. The War in Sudan and the Platforms of Regional Conflict
Current wars have organic connections to geopolitics across various regional belts worldwide. The war in Sudan has entered the quagmire of regional conflicts with international extensions. Sudan holds a unique position along the Red Sea belt, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and the Middle East, and is linked to wars over resource plunder, including water. Recently, the war inside Sudan has spilled over into neighboring countries. The longer a solution is delayed, the more regional complexities increase, and regional alliances linked to the war grow.
These four factors, along with others, complicate achieving a humanitarian truce. However, the world, and Sudan in particular, has experiences in matters of war and peace that can be beneficial.
Writing the Prescription for Peace
We learned from Dr. John Garang de Mabior that we must hasten in writing the prescription suitable for treating our country’s conditions and not leave it to others. The truce is undoubtedly coming, and it is a key condition that opens the path towards the right to life and the protection of civilians. However, the humanitarian truce will be deficient if the anti-war forces do not unite into a formidable front.
This requires building a broad front for peace, democracy, and citizenship, so that we define ourselves positively by what we work for, not merely by what we reject. We must write the prescription for which our people have struggled, and not leave the door open for a deal made in the name of peace that reproduces our previous crises and steers us towards a new war, rather than sustainable peace, citizenship without discrimination, and entrenched democracy.
