Professor Ebenezer Babatunde Obadare is a Nigerian-American academic who is the Douglas Dillon Senior Fellow for Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC. In this interview by LASISI OLAGUNJU, he speaks on the security challenges confronting Nigeria and on his offerings at the American Congressional hearing on Nigeria held in the US on Tuesday.
At Tuesday’s US congressional hearing on insecurity in Nigeria, you reportedly described Abuja’s claim that Christians and Muslims are equally targeted in Nigeria’s violence as a “myth.” What specific patterns or data convince you that the attacks are primarily religious rather than communal or criminal?
As a matter of fact, the attacks we’ve witnessed fall into all categories; that is, they are primarily religious, but also communal and criminal. What I have been trying to convey and what I was eager to emphasise during the hearing is that, while much of the commentary about violence in Nigeria addresses the communal and criminal aspects, there is a clear reluctance to recognise and describe its religious origins. I thought this was a clear case of intellectual mischief with serious consequences. If we can’t acknowledge the roots of a crisis, how can we expect to solve it? As for the attacks being primarily religious, the truth of the matter is that that was evident from the beginning. Boko Haram may have gone through several mutations in its volatile history, but it has never wavered when it comes to the reason why it started its campaign to destroy the Nigerian state, which it sees as iconic of the very modernity that it deems ideologically unpalatable, and replace it with a Sharia-based theocracy. If you look back at public and scholarly commentary on Boko Haram, the initial consensus at the beginning was very clear: we’re dealing with an Islamist insurgency whose essential premise is religious. The alternative framings of the crisis as “farmers against herders” or an aftermath of climate change, all that came later. When, according to numerous credible witnesses and victims, insurgents leave an unmistakable sectarian calling card by shouting “Allahu Akbar” in the process of carrying out their attacks, it is those who insist that there is no religious motive to those attacks who have some explaining to do.
You also argued that higher Muslim casualty figures reflect geography rather than equal targeting. Can you explain how geography shapes victim patterns, and why you believe this distinction is being overlooked by Nigerian officials?
I was referring to basically what everyone who has the most casual acquaintance with Boko Haram in the context of Nigeria knows, which is that it started out in the northeastern part of the country, specifically Borno State, and that Borno State is predominantly Muslim. If I recall correctly, when the late Abubakar Shekau declared an Islamic caliphate back in 2014, the purported seat of power was in Gwoza in the southeastern part of Borno State. As you know, Borno State is a Muslim majority state.
Accordingly, given Boko Haram’s penchant for indiscriminate killing, it is hardly rocket science that it would end up killing more Muslims than Christians in a state where Muslims are in the majority. In the same vein, it is hardly surprising that the more Boko Haram has extended its operations southward, for instance, into Adamawa State, which is 40 percent Christian, the more Christians it has killed. It’s just simple maths that you will kill more Christians in an area where Christians represent a larger percentage of the demographic.
As to why Nigerian officials continue to overlook the distinction, I think it’s part and parcel of the larger reluctance to discuss the religious origin of the crisis. You see, there is a price to be paid for willfully ignoring something that is sitting right under your nose, and that price in this case is that you become more and more distant from reality.
You were blunt in saying the Nigerian military is “too corrupt and incompetent” to defeat jihadist networks without external pressure. What systemic failures within the security sector, in your view, make meaningful progress impossible without foreign intervention?
My ultimate authority in this is the Nigerian military itself, so when I say that the Nigerian armed forces are corrupt, I am merely repeating what every Nigerian knows, and what generations of military officers, retired and serving, have echoed. To quote the famous words of former Chief of Army Staff Salihu Ibrahim, our’s is “an army of anything goes.”
One unexpected benefit of the Boko Haram debacle is that it has helped to expose corruption in the army, as well as the incompetence, and part of the tragedy is that the army itself has suffered much on account of this. For instance, if you read the new book by former Chief of Defence Staff Lucky Irabor, he mentions that no fewer than 2,700 officers and soldiers have been killed over 12 years in the battle against Boko Haram.
So, the military itself is endangered by Boko Haram. It’s also partly cosmic justice, especially when you consider that the same military spent decades interfering in civilian affairs and pretending to rule the country while all the while laying the foundation for its own destruction as an institution with a primary mandate to defend the country.
Corruption within the military is corrosive insofar as it means that the chain of authority, the very essence of the military as an institution, becomes unreliable. We all know about the material impact in terms of monies being stolen and inferior armor being purchased and all that; what tends to get left out is the damage to trust and morale when subordinates can no longer trust their superiors that the orders they have been asked to carry out are dictated by pure military interests. Most people may have forgotten, but distrust of the military’s capacity (and desperation to hold on to power) was the main reason that then-President Goodluck Jonathan decided to invite private military contractors (aka mercenaries) into the country early in 2015.
Incidentally, 2015 was the first time that I went public with my advocacy that Nigeria seek foreign help, and just to be clear, I have never asked for foreign intervention. My call then, as now, is for the country to eat the humble pie and admit that it cannot do this thing, that is, defeat Boko Haram, alone, and that it needs help. At this point, I see nothing wrong with asking for help, since it’s either that or you lose the country to insurgents. The other clarification is that help does not necessarily have to come from the US or the West. It can come from sister African countries with the capacity and determination to help. What is undeniable is that, for all the reasons I just stated, the Nigerian military cannot continue to pretend that it can go it alone.
Boko Haram and related groups were described by you as fundamentally anti- democratic. In what ways do their activities undermine Nigeria’s democratic institutions, and how has the government underestimated this dimension?
Boko Haram and similar jihadist groups are a threat to Nigeria’s democratic institutions because their core ideology is anti-democratic. As I mentioned in my statement to the hearing, groups like Boko Haram are interested in exclusion rather than inclusion. You can already see that exclusionary spirit at work in the pattern of killings they have carried out. Their rage is targeted at “outsiders,” which is anyone who disagrees with their barbaric ideology, which means a clear majority of Muslims and non-Muslims.
Democracy is about pluralism; jihadist ideology on the other hand is about essentialism, and that is why both cannot cohabit. In a democracy, disagreement, while par for the course, is settled according to law, but the point is that it is settled. On the contrary, and here I’m taking the liberty of quoting Professor Wole Soyinka, Boko Haram says “I’m right, you’re dead.” Democracy and Jihadism could not be more dissimilar and antagonistic in their core intuitions and commitments.
I think, again, official underestimation is a product of mischaracterization. Against all evidence and contrary to common sense, many continue to project to Boko Haram attributes and features that it cannot possess as a matter of definition, and which at any rate it has unflinchingly abjured. It’s self-deception of the first water, with the important caveat that while some may have deceived themselves as to Boko Haram’s intent, Boko Haram has been a model of consistency.
The U.S. Congress is preparing a Trump-directed report and appears ready to take a tougher stance on Nigeria’s religious-violence crisis. What form of “external pressure” do you believe would be both effective and ethically responsible?
I think every effort intended to (a) help Nigeria become more effective in its military campaign against Boko Haram and (b) pressure the government to do its job of protecting the security of all Nigerians regardless of faith or location is welcome. As it happens, we’re speaking just as the news is breaking that the US is contemplating new immigration rules that will potentially restrict visa issuance to individuals implicated in violations of religious freedom. It is a tragedy that we’re needing to have “external pressure” before the Nigerian authorities can be bothered to do what is expected of them, legally and morally, but if the outcome is that Nigerians are safer in their communities and Boko Haram is extirpated, so be it.
Some analysts warn that framing the crisis as mainly anti-Christian could deepen sectarian tensions. How do you balance the need for accurate diagnosis with the risks of reinforcing polarisation?
I think we have to be absolutely clear that Boko Haram does not target Christians exclusively, and that, as I have hopefully made clear, they target Muslims as well, and indeed Nigerians of all stripes. Nonetheless, it is equally important that we do not deny the religious impulse behind Boko Haram’s activities. Clarity is charity, and the best antidote to polarization is accuracy and honesty in our characterization of what Boko Haram stands for. Boko Haram is a mortal threat to Nigeria, and accordingly, the struggle against the group and its nefarious agenda is one that all Nigerians- Muslim, Christian, agnostic- must get with.
You recommended disbanding armed religious militias as part of the solution. Which groups specifically fall into this category, and what practical steps would be required for the Nigerian government to dismantle them?
I am genuinely convinced that there can be no progress in terms of interfaith amity and everyday social intercourse in the Sharia states of northern Nigeria unless (1) Sharia is declared unconstitutional and (2) the various militias established more or less to advance the cause of Sharia are abolished. It is the latter groups, the hisbahs, that I was referencing. If you don’t believe me about the hisbahs being militias formed and funded by the various states to advance the cause of Sharia, allow me to quote former Zamfara State Governor Ahmed Sani Yerima. The following is part of what he said about hisbah’s duties back in July 2003 when he announced the creation of the state’s hisbah commission in Gusau, the state capital, and incidentally, I have it at hand: “…monitoring the implementation and application of laws relating to Shari’a; ensuring proper compliance with the teachings of Shari’a by workers in the private and public sector; monitoring the daily proceedings of Shari’a courts to ensure compliance with the Shari’a penal code and code of criminal procedure; reporting on all actions likely to tamper with the proper dispensation of justice; keeping a record of all people in prison with pending hudud cases; taking every measure to sanitize society of all social vices and whatever vice or crime is prohibited by Shari’a; taking every measure to ensure conformity with the teachings of Shari’a by the general public in matters of worship, dress code, and social and business interaction and relationships; and enlightening the general public on the Shari’a system and its application.”
As you can see, it is not just Sharia that has to go, it is all the other entities and programs set up at taxpayers’ expense to advance it. I think the hisbahs of this world can be put out of existence the same way that they were brought into it, which is through ordinary gubernatorial proclamation. As for Sharia itself, I think the Federal Government can bring the matter to court as a direct violation of the Nigerian constitution. I’m not a lawyer, so I don’t know if one constituent state has the locus standi to do it. As a matter of fact, I’m sure it does not. The most practicable way to go about it is for a legal resident of any of the Sharia states to bring suit challenging its constitutionality. Either way, Sharia has got to go.
You also criticised Nigeria’s slow response to early warning signs. What early indicators are consistently ignored, and what mechanisms, domestic or international, could compel Abuja to act before violence escalates?
There have been several recorded instances of villagers getting intelligence that their communities were going to come under attack from insurgents and relaying such tips to security personnel, only to see nothing done about it. In 2025, with all the possibilities out there in terms of digital communication, this is totally unacceptable. The idea here is that state agents should use the facilities already at their disposal effectively. The thing about most modern security apparatuses and gadgets is that they are not all that expensive. Combined with good old word-of-mouth intelligence, they can help security personnel in apprehending danger and neutralizing bad actors before they strike.
Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (Syndigate.info).
