A Personal Reflection on Japan’s Postwar Legacy
Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, who is set to step down in the middle of this month, has released a “Personal Message on the 80th Anniversary of the Postwar Era.” Despite opposition from hardline conservative lawmakers within Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, he has declared his convictions before leaving office. The prime minister’s personal message is not an official government position, as it has not been approved by the Cabinet.
However, it is known that Prime Minister Ishiba believes in preserving his message as a historical record, given the weight of his position. Even before becoming prime minister, Ishiba was famous for his “Ishiba Color,” a term referring to his habit of expressing his thoughts in his own words. What does Prime Minister Ishiba perceive as Japan’s “past history”? Below is the full text released by the Prime Minister’s Office. The document spans seven A4 pages, approximately 6,000 characters. The translation adheres closely to the original, with additional explanations provided in parentheses where necessary.
Marking 80 Years Since the End of the War
Prologue
Eighty years have passed since the conclusion of the Greater East Asian War (Pacific War). For 80 years, Japan has consistently walked the path of a peaceful nation, striving for global peace and prosperity. The peace and prosperity Japan enjoys today were built upon the precious lives lost in the war and the hardships of history.
This year, through visits to Iwo Jima in March, the war memorial in Calirraya, the Philippines, in April, attendance at the Okinawa War Dead Memorial Ceremony and the Himeyuri Peace Memorial Museum in June, participation in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb memorial and peace ceremonies in August, and the National War Dead Memorial Ceremony on the anniversary of the end of the war (Japan’s defeat, August 15), I reaffirmed my commitment to deeply reflect on the lessons and regrets of the war.
On the 50th, 60th, and 70th anniversaries of the postwar era, successive prime ministers issued statements. I, too, inherit the historical perspectives of past administrations. In the three previous statements, there was little mention of “why the war could not be avoided.” Even the 70th-anniversary statement only briefly noted, “Japan attempted to resolve diplomatic and economic deadlocks through force, and the domestic political system failed to act as a brake.” Beyond this, no detailed discussion followed.
Why did the domestic political system fail to act as a brake?
After World War I, as the world entered the era of total war, predictions by institutions such as the “Total War Research Institute” established by the Cabinet and the so-called “Akibamarakan” (Autumn Circle) within the Army Ministry indicated that defeat was inevitable. Many experts recognized the difficulty of waging war. Despite the government and military leadership being aware of this, why did they fail to make the decision to avoid war, instead plunging into a reckless conflict that caused immense sacrifice at home and abroad? Even after former Prime Minister Mitsumasa Yonai warned, “We must be cautious not to become poor all at once in an attempt to avoid gradual poverty,” why could the war path not be reconsidered? On the 80th anniversary of the postwar era, I wish to reflect on these questions with the Japanese people.
Problems with the Meiji Constitution
First, institutional flaws of the time are often cited. Prewar Japan lacked a structure to properly integrate politics and the military. Under the Meiji Constitution, the supreme command authority over the military was considered independent, and the principle of “civilian control”—that politics, or civilians, should always hold supremacy over the military—was not institutionalized.
The prime minister’s authority was also limited. Under the Meiji Constitution, the prime minister and state ministers were considered equal, and while the prime minister was the head, he was not institutionally granted command authority over the Cabinet. Nevertheless, until the Russo-Japanese War, elder statesmen (genro) played a role in unifying diplomacy, military, and finance. These samurai-turned-politicians, having experienced military service, understood and could control the military. As political scientist Masao Maruyama noted, “The mediation of figures beyond the constitution, such as elder statesmen and senior officials, was crucial in unifying the nation’s will.”
As the genro passed away and the informal mediation structure collapsed, political parties under the Taisho democracy attempted to integrate politics and the military. Amid the global upheaval of World War I, Japan became a key collaborator in the international community and a permanent member of the League of Nations. In the 1920s, under the Shidehara Diplomacy, imperialist expansion was restrained. Public opinion in the 1920s was indifferent to the military, and politics advocated for large-scale disarmament. The military’s influence narrowed, and this backlash is considered one of the backgrounds for the military’s rise in the early Showa era.
Originally, the supreme command authority was limited to military operations, while military administration—such as budgets and organizational reforms—fell under the jurisdiction of state ministers within the Cabinet. The absence of civilian control was, in practice, mitigated by the genro and later by political parties.
Problems with the Government
However, the interpretation of the supreme command authority gradually expanded, and it began to be used as a means to exclude government and parliamentary oversight over military policy and budgets.
During the party cabinet era, political parties engaged in scandals to undermine each other, losing public trust. In 1930, the opposition Constitutional Politicians’ Association (Rikken Seiyukai) colluded with factions within the Navy to attack the Constitutional Democratic Party (Rikken Minseito) Cabinet, condemning the ratification of the London Naval Treaty as an “infringement on supreme command authority.” The government narrowly ratified the treaty.
In 1935, the Constitutional Politicians’ Association attacked the government over Tatsuki Minobe’s “Emperor as an Organ of the State” theory, a constitutional scholar and House of Peers member. The issue escalated into a political crisis involving the military. Prime Minister Keisuke Okada’s Cabinet attempted to separate the academic debate from politics, stating, “Such theoretical issues should be left to scholars.” However, the Cabinet eventually succumbed to military pressure, issuing two “National Essence Clarification” statements denying the previously accepted theory. Minobe’s books were banned.
Through this process, the government gradually lost control over the military.
Problems with the Legislature
The legislature, which should have controlled the military, also lost its function. The worst example is the expulsion of Takao Saito, a member of the House of Representatives. On February 2, 1940, during a plenary session, Saito criticized the nation’s descent into a quagmire of war and sharply questioned the government’s objectives—a so-called anti-war speech. The Army, deeming the speech insulting, demanded punishment, and a majority of 296 to 7 voted to expel Saito. This was a rare instance of a legislator attempting to fulfill his role to prevent war, but two-thirds of his speech remains deleted from the official record to this day.
Even in budget deliberations, where the legislature should have checked the military, it failed. After 1937, a special wartime budget account was established, and from 1942 to 1945, nearly all military expenses were allocated through it. During deliberations, budget details were not disclosed, and both houses conducted secret sessions with extremely short review periods—barely qualifying as deliberations. As the war worsened and finances strained, the Army and Navy fiercely competed for budgets, prioritizing their own interests and prestige.
Moreover, from the late Taisho to early Showa eras, over 15 years, many politicians, including three sitting prime ministers, were assassinated by ultranationalists and young officers. These politicians had advocated international cooperation and attempted civilian control of the military. Incidents like the May 15th and February 26th Affairs significantly undermined the environment in which politicians and bureaucrats could freely discuss and act on military policies and budgets.
Problems with the Media
Another critical issue was the media. In the 1920s, the media was critical of Japan’s external expansion, with journalist Danzan Ishibashi advocating for the abandonment of colonies. However, around the time of the Manchurian Incident, media rhetoric shifted to active war support—driven by public demand, and newspaper circulations surged. Following the 1929 Great Depression, Europe and the United States adopted protectionist high-tariff policies, severely impacting Japan’s exports. Amid economic hardship, nationalism grew, with the rise of Nazis in Germany and Fascists in Italy. Only the Soviet Union appeared to be advancing, and intellectual circles spread notions like “the era of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism has ended” and “the age of the Anglo-American powers is over,” creating fertile ground for totalitarianism and state socialism.
In this context, part of the Kwantung Army triggered the Manchurian Incident, occupying territory several times the size of Japan within a year and a half. Newspapers sensationalized this, and the public was exhilarated, further fueling nationalism. In diplomacy, Sakuzō Yoshino criticized the military’s actions in Manchuria, and Kiyoshi Kiyosawa sternly condemned Yōsuke Matsuoka’s withdrawal from the League of Nations. However, from autumn 1937, media censorship intensified, suppressing policy criticism. Only pro-war rhetoric reached the public.
Problems with Intelligence Collection and Analysis
It is also worth reconsidering whether Japan, including its government, correctly understood international affairs. For example, in August 1939, while negotiating a military alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union, the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was signed, forcing Prime Minister Kiichirō Hiranuma to resign, stating, “The European sky and earth have produced a complex and bizarre new situation.” Questions arose about whether sufficient intelligence was gathered, correctly analyzed, and properly shared regarding international and military situations.
Lessons for Today
Postwar Japan institutionalized civilian control. The Constitution stipulates that the prime minister and state ministers must be civilians, and the Self-Defense Forces operate under the prime minister’s command. The Cabinet, as the head of government, bears collective responsibility to the Diet, ensuring institutional unity. The National Security Council was established to strengthen comprehensive coordination of diplomacy and security, and the government’s intelligence framework has improved. These institutions must continue to evolve with the times.
Japan learned from its bitter experience of military runaway under the pretense of supreme command authority, lacking a structure to integrate politics and the military. However, institutions alone are meaningless without proper operation. Politicians must possess the capability and insight to utilize the Self-Defense Forces. Continuous effort is needed to correctly understand and appropriately operate the current civilian control system. Politicians must maintain pride and responsibility, resisting irresponsible populism and avoiding being swept away by trends.
The Self-Defense Forces, as expert organizations, have a responsibility to proactively explain international security environments, equipment, and unit operations to the political sphere and voice their opinions. Politics must integrate across organizational boundaries to protect national interests. History shows that internal divisions and conflicts—such as between the Army and Navy, or between military operations and administration—prevented unified national decision-making, leading to war.
Politics must always consider the welfare of all citizens and make rational judgments from a long-term perspective. In ambiguous situations with unclear responsibility, bold solutions with low success probabilities and high risks are often accepted. Admiral Osami Nagano of the Navy compared war to surgery, stating, “Though worrisome, to cure a major illness, one must make a bold decision to overcome national crisis” and “The government judged that not fighting would doom the nation, but fighting might also lead to ruin. However, to perish without fighting would mean losing even one’s soul—a true ruin.” Hideki Tōjō, then War Minister, pressured Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, saying, “Humans sometimes need to close their eyes and leap from the Shimizu Stage”—a reference to Kyoto’s Kiyomizu-dera temple, symbolizing a life-risking leap.
Such emotionally driven judgments, rather than calm and rational ones, misguided the nation’s path. This history must not repeat. The legislature and media act as brakes to prevent governmental misjudgment. The Diet must exercise its constitutional authority to appropriately oversee the government. Politics must not compromise national interests for temporary public favor or popularity, nor should it be mired in partisan or self-preservation tactics.
A mission-driven journalism and healthy media space are essential. During the war, media incited public opinion, leading the nation into reckless conflict. Excessive commercialism must be avoided, and narrow nationalism, discrimination, and xenophobia must not be tolerated. Violence that suppresses politics or threatens free media—including the tragic assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—can never be accepted. The foundation of all this is learning from history. The courage and sincerity to confront the past, and the tolerance to humbly listen to others’ views, are what make liberalism and robust democracy invaluable.
As Winston Churchill observed, democracy is not a perfect system. It requires time and resources, and it sometimes errs. Thus, we must always remain humble before history and deeply internalize its lessons. Maintaining a capable organization for self-defense and deterrence is crucial. I cannot deny the theory of deterrence; it is a reality for responsible security policy under current conditions. However, if such a powerful organization operates beyond democratic control, democracy can collapse instantly. Conversely, civilian politicians may misjudge and lead to war. Therefore, the necessity and importance of civilian control and appropriate civil-military relations cannot be overstated. The government, legislature, military, and media must always recognize this.
In his anti-war speech, Takao Saito stated, “World history is the history of war, where the strong conquer the weak, not justice. We must not overlook this and ruin the nation’s century-long plans under the guise of a ‘just war.’” He emphasized the importance of realism-based policy and was expelled from the Diet. The following year, during a Diet committee on air defense laws, the Army denied citizens’ right to evacuate during air raids, claiming it signified a collapse of wartime resolve.
Though these events are distant history, they vividly illustrate the dangers of legislative abdication of responsibility, the prevalence of spiritualism, and the disregard for human life and rights. Without confronting history, a bright future cannot be achieved. As Japan faces one of its most severe and complex security environments since the war, it must reaffirm the importance of learning from history.
As those who remember the war dwindle and memories fade, it is crucial for every citizen, especially the younger generation, to actively reflect on the meaning of past wars and peace, passing these lessons to future generations. This will strengthen the foundation of Japan as a peaceful nation. Together with the Japanese people, I will do everything possible to ensure that the horrors of war are never repeated, based on the diverse lessons of the past.
October 10, Reiwa 7 (meaning 2025)
Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru
