The Psychological Impact of Subsea Cable Cutting Technology
The vulnerability of submarine cables during conflicts has raised concerns about seabed infrastructure, affecting global communication and maritime safety. In recent months, 17 Asian and European nations have increased their collaboration on defense strategies. However, the two largest marine powers, China and the United States, were not among those countries involved.
From the blow-up of the Nord Stream pipeline to the development of new technology such as China’s deep-sea cable cutter, the seabed has become a new front in geopolitics. While the actual sabotage of cables remains rare, the psychological power of such technology is significant, especially in the context of hybrid warfare.
According to Tony O’Sullivan, CEO of global internet service provider RETN, the real threat lies in the psychological effect of cable cutter technology rather than its physical impact. “It does not have quite the same devastating impact with a single use, but it is exactly like a nuclear weapon in a sense that it is not the actual use of it, [but] the threat of the use of it is the bigger issue,” O’Sullivan said in Hong Kong.
He explained that the threat creates unease in populations, disturbing their normal operations of government or political systems. “I do not see the actual idea of cable cuts as the threat. I see the threat to the internet more coming from naivety about network design.”
Global Network of Submarine Cables
Most of the world’s intercontinental internet traffic travels on a global network of submarine fibre-optic cables measuring 1.5 million km (932,000 miles). Every year, around 150 to 200 subsea cable faults occur worldwide. According to the International Cable Protection Committee, while state-sponsored sabotage remains a risk, accidental damage is the predominant cause of damage to submarine cables.
The non-profit organization based in Britain stated that around 70 to 80 percent of these incidents are caused by human activities such as commercial fishing and ships’ anchors, while others result from abrasion, equipment failure, and natural hazards. Although sabotage is a small percentage of damage, it remains an important consideration as a risk. There have been some incidents of deliberate or intentional damage via equipment theft or vandalism, though no verified cases of state-sponsored sabotage since World War II have been recorded.
Challenges in Verifying Sabotage
British telecoms minister Liz Lloyd recently mentioned that the country’s military tracks Russian submarines operating in British waters. She commented on the difficulties of verifying these incidents, stating that their mission was to survey cables in peacetime so they could more easily sabotage them in conflict. However, malicious activity below the ocean surface often operates in the ‘grey zone,’ making it hard to prove and prosecute.
Russia has rejected these claims, stating that it has never threatened underwater infrastructure critical to the United Kingdom and does not use aggressive rhetoric on this issue.
Accidental Cuts and Network Resilience
O’Sullivan pointed out that the panic surrounding malicious activity overlooks the reality that the world’s subsea cables are already being cut constantly by accident. “There are hundreds of cable cuts around the year, around the world every single year, which happen by accident,” he said. The majority of these breaks are caused by ships dragging anchors, while cuts around Taiwan and Japan often result from seismic or volcanic activity.
Echoing the International Cable Protection Committee, O’Sullivan added that there had been no proven cases of sabotage or malicious activity in recent years, even during the Ukraine war. He attributed the perception of increased cuts to the rise in global shipping rates after the pandemic, leading to more anchor drags and cable cuts.
Network Design and Diversification
RETN operates a high-capacity backbone network measuring 142,000 km, ensuring redundancy and avoiding bottlenecks on popular routes. It developed a 15,000 km terrestrial route connecting Frankfurt to Hong Kong via Central Asia as an alternative to subsea-heavy paths.
O’Sullivan emphasized that the internet’s highly resilient architecture is often compromised not by nefarious actors but by poor network usage management. He highlighted a “concentration risk” when businesses prioritize cost over diversity in cable usage. This risk surfaced in 2024 when multiple cables in the Red Sea were severed after a cargo vessel, sunk by Houthi militants, dragged its anchors along the seabed.
Repair Time and Geopolitical Challenges
One of the greatest technical challenges is repair time. Terrestrial cable repairs typically take under eight hours, while subsea repairs can last from four weeks to more than nine months due to a shortage of repair vessels and complex diplomatic hurdles.
“There’s no company that is going to send one of their cable repair ships into an active war zone or where they also might get attacked,” O’Sullivan said. He stressed the importance of protecting and properly designing telecommunication and data communication infrastructure, comparing them to ports and airports of old.
Conclusion
Network planners should consider diversifying their networks across different levels, including path, region, geopolitics, supplier, and equipment, to avoid supply constraints. As the world becomes more antagonistic, ensuring network resilience is crucial for maintaining global communication.
